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ARTICLE
The Art of the Intelligence Autopsy
JAMES J. WIRTZ*
ABSTRACT Although intelligence postmortems are a common practice in the aftermath
of intelligence failure, little is known about how they are conducted. This article
explores the methodology employed by Robert Jervis in intelligence postmortems that
followed the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the formulation of the 2002 Iraq
national intelligence estimate that warned of the possibility that Iraq had restarted its
nuclear program. The analysis reveals the challenges faced by scholars as they attempt to
assess why analysts failed to offer accurate estimates and the way contemporary
international relations theory can be applied to the realm of policy. The findings of the
postmortems also shed light on areas where additional collaboration among scholars
and analysts can advance the art of intelligence analysis.
Investigations often occur into the performance of the intelligence community;
postmortems are common following intelligence failures and successes. For
instance, there were 10 official investigations into the intelligence failure
surrounding the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the last of
which concluded on 15 December 1995.1 Four postmortems even occurred
following the US intelligence community’s successful effort at detecting Soviet
missile deployments in Cuba.2 For the most part, however, these investigations
leave a meager trail related to the theoretical assumptions and techniques used
to assess the available record, which raises several questions. Do assessment
teams rely on scholarly works to evaluate analytic performance, looking to the
available literature as a guide to their judgments?Or are their assessmentsmore
narrowly focused on organizational issues and priorities? Is there a common
methodology when it comes to conducting intelligence postmortems?Does this
methodology have anything to do when it comes to the scholarly literature on
q 2013 Taylor & Francis
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1James J. Wirtz, ‘Responding to Surprise’ in NelsonW. Polsby (ed.) Annual Review of Political
Science (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews 2006) p.46.
2Max M. Holland, ‘The Politics of Intelligence Post-mortems’ in Loch K. Johnson (ed.)
Strategic Intelligence, Vol. 2 (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International 2007)
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intelligence? Exactly what is the interaction between theory and practice when
it comes to developing useful metrics for intelligence analysts?
Two postmortems that have recently entered the scholarly debate can help
answer these questions. These assessments were undertaken by Robert Jervis,
who is best known for his scholarship on international relations, especially the
way human cognition shapes foreign and defense policies. Jervis conducted
his first intelligence autopsy between November 1978 and June 1979. It dealt
with the failure of the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Foreign
Assessment Center to warn of the Shah of Iran’s inability or unwillingness to
respond forcefully to the Islamic revolution led by the Ayatollah Khomeini.3
The second, launched in the late summer of 2004, addressed the 2002
national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction.4
Jervis’s intelligence autopsies are unique, however, in the way they delve into
the cognitive and methodological challenges facing analysts, and in terms of
the insights they shed on the general phenomena of intelligence failure. By
focusing on analytical flaws and the very process of intelligence analysis itself,
they also stand in contrast to the emphasis on organizational shortcomings
and reform that has emerged in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
terror attacks.5 Both postmortems engage intelligence professionals in a
theoretically sophisticated discussion of analytical tradecraft with an eye
towards identifying flaws in logic and methodology.
The research strategy employed in both postmortems is derived from Jervis’s
scholarly work, especially his writings on the impact of human cognition on
world politics.6 First, an effort is made to identify the roots, nature and scope of
the dominant cognitive framework that shapes analysts’ (and often) policy-
makers’ perceptions of unfolding events. Because postmortems by their nature
select on the dependent variable, it is safe to assume (or with the aid of
hindsight it already is obvious) that the dominant cognitive framework in
question offered a poor analytical lens to interpret unfolding events.7 This leads
3‘Analysis of NFAC’s Performance on Iran’s Domestic Crisis, Mid-1977–November 1978’,
declassified as CIA-RDP86B00269R001100110003-4. Hereafter referred to as the Iran Report.
4Robert Jervis, Richard Betts, Melvyn Leffler and James Wirtz, ‘Report on CIA Tradecraft,
Analysis, and the Iraq WMD NIE’, unpublished report, 13 December 2004; several of the
findings of this report are reflected in Robert Jervis, ‘Reports, Politics and Intelligence Failures:
The Case of Iraq’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 29/1 (2006) pp.3–52.
5Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, FBI and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press 2007).
6Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1976); Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970).
7By contrast, when individuals are equipped with cognitive schema that happen to
approximate reality and are provided with information that accurately portrays unfolding
events, they can appear to be downright prophetic. The estimates offered by John McCone,
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in the weeks leading up to the CubanMissile Crisis
provides a good illustration of this phenomenon; see Peter S. Usowski, ‘John McCone and the
Cuban Missile Crisis: A Persistent Approach to the Intelligence–Policy Relationship’,
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2/4 (Winter 1998) pp.547–576.





































to the second stage of the postmortem: tracing the myriad ways cognitive flaws
manifest in misperception, faulty logic and a general failure to recognize
analytic, procedural and organizational shortcomings that impede the
production of accurate and timely warning and analysis. By reviewing
documentary evidence, and conducting extensive interviews, it becomes
possible to reconstruct how analysts interpreted information about ongoing
events. Participants also have an opportunity to express their own observations
about analytical, procedural and organizational shortcomings to a neutral
observer, which makes it possible to discern the weaknesses that bedevil the
entire enterprise. Problems are often apparent ex ante to intelligence managers
and analysts; they simply lack a way to gather and express their thoughts in a
constructive manner.
The fact that the methodology and research design employed in these
postmortems is straightforward, however, should not overshadow the
personal, bureaucratic and political issues that lurk just behind the scenes of
the entire enterprise. Professional reputations are sometimes on the line as the
researcher documents the way analysts failed ‘to connect the dots’ as events
unfolded. Jervis also points to the fundamental uncertainties and artificialities
created by any ex post facto investigation of what was on the minds of people
ex ante. It is hard to determine the extent to which a retrospective
examination distorts the recollections of the situation facing analysts in the
weeks and months preceding some crisis:
The conditions under which people worked fade and become obscure
even in their minds and can never be known by the reviewer. Such a
person knows what the outcome of the events is, and he cannot fail to
be influenced by that knowledge. Moreover, the material that he reads
in order to determine what happened, what people knew, and what
they wrote about it comes to him in a form much different from the
way it comes to the intelligence analyst. The reviewer has the
opportunity to read material through in a coherent order. For the
analyst working on events as they happened, material or information
must be absorbed as it comes in – sometimes in fragments, often not in
a timely fashion.8
Empathy with the situation confronting analysts and a recognition of the
inescapable influence of hindsight is thus crucial to both the credibility and
accuracy of an intelligence postmortem. Nevertheless, analysts too have to
face the reality that estimates written to meet the needs of the day have to
withstand the test of time.
The Iran and Iraq intelligence postmortems represent an important
benchmark both in the study of intelligence and in the history of the US
intelligence community. In the late 1970s, the way that beliefs shaped
analysts’ perceptions, and effort to make them receptive to discrepant
information, were just emerging in a formal way as key elements of analytic
8Iran Report, pp.3–4.





































tradecraft.9 The postmortems also highlight the role played by international
relations theorists in the emergence of intelligence studies as an important
sub-field in political science. By offering theoretically informed and rigorous
insights into government policy and processes, these postmortems stand as
examples of scholarly support to the formation and conduct of public policy,
a contribution from the academy that is rare today.10 They also demonstrate
the impact of intelligence studies on the practice of intelligence. The
sophistication of the postmortems, and the ability of the target audience to
understand what went wrong, has apparently improved over time.
To support these claims and to illustrate the interaction between theory
and practice between intelligence studies and the intelligence community, the
article begins by placing Jervis’s work in the literature on intelligence analysis
and by describing the fundamental analytical and theoretical insights he
brings to the intelligence autopsy. It then describes the findings of the
intelligence postmortems. It concludes by offering some observations on the
issues raised by these intelligence postmortems and the way they relate to
contemporary issues of intelligence reform.
Stepping Outside the Historical Moment
The role of human cognition in intelligence failure became a matter of public
and scholarly interest in the aftermath of the 7 December 1941 Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor. Although several investigations, blue ribbon panels
and boards of inquiry were launched in the aftermath of the attacks,
Congressmen agreed to forgo the politically divisive Congressional hearings
into the fiasco until the conclusion of the war effort. When the Joint
Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack released its
39-volume report in 1946, the image it depicted of the situation inside the US
government was highly disturbing. By listing and describing all the ‘signals’
related to the possibility of hostile Japanese action, their findings suggested
that it was in fact possible to predict the onset of hostilities with Japan and
that only incompetence, dereliction of duty, or general inattention to detail
could explain a failure to anticipate the attack.
Today, the findings of the report still influence our thinking about
intelligence in two important and relevant ways. First, it is generally assumed
that accurate information about what is about to transpire always exists
somewhere in the intelligence pipeline prior to the occurrence of surprise;
9Jervis actually appended portions of Perception and Misperception to the Iran Report, and
cites favorably Richards Heuer’s early classified work on the impact of cognition on
intelligence analysis; see Iran Report, p.29. For an unclassified version of Heuer’s contribution
to analytic tradecraft see Richards Heuer, Jr, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington,
DC: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence 1999).
10Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy
(Washington, DC: USIP Press 1993); Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘Scholars on the Sidelines’,Washington
Post, 13 April 2009, http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/
AR2009041202260html (accessed 22 November 2012).





































explaining why analysts and officials have a hard time recognizing this data
for what it is forms the basis of the scholarly effort to understand the
cognitive sources of intelligence failure. Second, following the recommen-
dations of the Joint Committee, it is generally assumed that better data
‘fusion’ can solve the intelligence problem. If all relevant data together can be
delivered to a central location – hence the creation of the US Central
Intelligence Agency – analysts would have an easier time ‘connecting the
dots’ to better anticipate future events. This second finding also happens to
provide the basis of organizational explanations of intelligence failure.
The first important reassessment of these findings emerged with the 1962
publication of Roberta Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor Warning and Decision.11
Wohlstetter, who based her work on the empirical data contained in the 1946
report, objected to the Committee’s finding that incompetence offered the
best explanation of analysts’ failure to recognize indications of impending
attack and that better data fusion could overcome human frailty or sheer
incompetence when it came to intelligence analysis. Wohlstetter noted that
the Committee’s analysis of events and conclusions were heavily influenced
by hindsight and that one could only understand the Pearl Harbor disaster by
viewing it in the context of the day. From this perspective, the ‘signals’ that
were so clear to observers in 1946 now became overwhelmed by ‘noise’,
irrelevant or misleading information about unfolding events. Wohlstetter
described the prevailing mindset of the analysts, officers and officials as they
monitored the unfolding situation. Americans shared one view in common –
there was no compelling reason for the Japanese to attack the United States.
The Japanese might strike the Soviet Union, to eliminate its rival at a moment
of great weakness, or the French, Dutch and British to seize important natural
resources for their war effort in China. But from the American perspective, it
made no sense for the Japanese to attack a far greater power in their rampage
across the Pacific, dooming them to a long, attritional campaign that they had
no hope of winning.
Wohlstetter confirmed that there were indeed signals in the intelligence
pipeline, but that these signals were incredibly difficult to discern against
background noise and the general context of ongoing events, especially when
reality was at odds with analysts’ and officials’ mindsets. Under these
circumstances, data fusion simply adds to the intelligence problem because
there is no a priori way to separate the wheat from the chaff when it comes to
collecting data. Wohlstetter concluded that there was no solution to the
problem of intelligence failure; it would be best if policy-makers adopted
‘intelligence-proof’ or ‘human-proof’ systems when it came to critical matters
such as the survivability of the US nuclear deterrent.
Wohlstetter’s gloomy conclusion, however, left a host of questions about
the interaction between humans and information unanswered. For example,
she could identify but not explain the kaleidoscope effect, the fact that it is
easy with the aid of hindsight to separate signals from noise in the intelligence
11Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University
Press 1962).





































pipeline. She also could not explain why preconceptions and prevailing
wisdom held such a grip on analysts and officials even when they were
confronted with disturbing information that should have undermined their
beliefs.
Jervis’s work on the role of cognition directly addresses these issues.
It explains how pre-existing beliefs about an unfolding situation act as a filter,
drawing individuals’ attention to data that confirms these beliefs, while
filtering out information that does not conform to existing schema.12 These
beliefs can be based on analogies, which often reflect events within living
history or personal experiences, or prevailing theories about world politics,
or existing judgments concerning likely trends in world or national politics.
Regardless of the exact origin of an individual’s belief system, the principle of
‘availability’ drives their perceptions: people tend to interpret information
based what is on their mind at the moment the information is received. For
example, prior to Pearl Harbor, US officers and officials were pre-occupied by
the political limits on their ability to interfere in potential Japanese aggression
in Southeast Asia. As a result, they failed to realize that the Japanese might
want a more certain guarantee that the United States would not move to stop
the expansion of their ‘Co-prosperity Sphere’. In other words, the Japanese
were about to respond to a problem that to American minds did not exist.
Jervis also highlights several common ‘biases’ that often emerge in
descriptions of intelligence failure. ‘Mirror imaging’, the tendency to rely on
perceptions of ‘us’ to explain ‘them’ is a pitfall well known to analysts.
It emerges because individuals tend to ‘fill in the blanks’ when it comes to
explaining or anticipating the behavior of others using experiences that are
most salient (available). Observers also tend to see the behavior of opponents’
as highly strategic, centralized and rational. In fact, analysts and officials
often ascribe an ability to orchestrate resources and capabilities to opponents
that upon realistic reflection is beyond the capability of any terrorist cell,
bureaucracy or national government. As a result, when confronted with
evidence of an unfolding initiative that appears irrational from their
perspective, analysts tend to dismiss signals of some emerging fait accompli
or attack as too ‘hare-brained’, or risky to be taken seriously. This rationality
bias actually offers an alternative definition of the kaleidoscope effect: events
that appear to be too incredible to be taken seriously ex ante in hindsight
appear too cut and dried to be ignored.
There are literally scores of cognitive biases that canmanifest in pitfalls that
are specific to intelligence analysis and Jervis makes good use of these biases
when it comes to identifying analysts’ specific lapses of situational awareness,
logic and judgment. These ‘idiosyncratic’ explanations of intelligence failure,
however, have an uncanny tendency to ‘cluster’ in support of the dominant
12John Hollister Hedley describes the impact of ‘mindset’ on analysis somewhat differently:
‘Mindset is the tendency to evaluate newly acquired information through an existing
hypothesis, rather than using new information to reassess the premises of the hypothesis itself’;
see John Hollister Hedley, ‘The Challenges of Intelligence Analysis’ in Loch K. Johnson (ed.)
Strategic Intelligence, Vol. 1 (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International 2007) p.133.





































beliefs embraced by analysts and officials. Like flags flying in unison, these
intelligence pathologies and pitfalls align themselves in the support of
dominant beliefs, making it even more difficult for analysts to recognize flaws
in their analysis. For example, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
identified a ‘layering’ effect in related to the Iraq national intelligence estimate,
whereby assessmentswere based on previous judgments (i.e. that Iraqwas had
active weapons of mass destruction programs) without carrying forward the
uncertainties involved in earlier estimates.13 The fact that individuals are
generally unaware of how their pre-conceptions guide their perceptionsmakes
it hard for them to recognize intelligence pathologies that do not obviously
contradict their beliefs. It also makes it difficult for them to recognize the
myriad ways these beliefs can shape seemingly innocuous aspects of their
analysis, elements of their estimates that in hindsight turn out to be critical.
Identifying and understanding the dominant belief systems is thus critical
to explaining why analysts and officials interpret unfolding events because it
provides the critical context necessary to understand how information
appeared without the gift of hindsight. It can also explain why certain
intelligence pathologies, so obvious after events have unfolded, become
virtually invisible before things are fully cut and dried. Jervis’s work also
suggests that the hardest task facing analysts is the need to step outside their
own strategic context and historical moment and to understand how their
beliefs shape their perceptions of reality. In a sense, analysts and officials are
like travelers riding on a moving walkway at an airport. Unless they take
some deliberate or unusual action (e.g. jump off the walkway), they will be
swept up by data streams, the flow of everyday events, previous judgments,
and bureaucratic processes along a strait line determined by their dominant
belief systems.
The Fall of the Shah
The Iran report, which was co-authored with John P. Devlin, is not a typical
postmortem in the sense that it does not assess an instance of outright or
clear-cut intelligence failure. It is more of an inquiry into why the intelligence
community overestimated the ‘staying power’ of the Shah’s regime when
there were repeated indications that unusual forms of political instability
were emerging in Iran. The study covers the period from the summer of 1977,
when information began to be received that the Shah faced serious opposition
to 7 November 1978, the day after Shah installed a military government in
response to domestic unrest. Hours later, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) warned that the Shah had delayed too long at taking decisive action
and that the future of the Pahlavi dynasty was not going to be settled quickly
using traditional methods to repress domestic opposition. As things were
becoming cut and dried, the CIA began to draw attention to the fact that the
Shah was in serious trouble.
13Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, 7 July 2004, p.22.





































Another interesting aspect of the Iran report is that it traces the impact of
several intelligence pathologies that also emerge on the pages of the Iraq
postmortem even though the former is an instance of Type II error and the
later is a case of Type I error. An externality also emerges as part of the
study: officials seemed to interpret Jervis’s methodology and fundamental
theoretical assumptions as a form of hindsight.14 These officials did not
seem to recognize the importance of privileging one set of beliefs over
another when it came to understanding how the analysts involved in
monitoring events in Iran developed their judgments. The Iran report, along
with official reaction to its findings, also was completed entirely before the
real reason was known why the Shah hesitated when faced with an
emerging threat to his regime. Neither the authors of the postmortem nor
the government officials who initially responded to its findings knew that
the Shah was terminally ill with cancer, although there were hints from the
field that the Shah appeared ‘depressed, dispirited and uncertain’ in the fall
of 1978.15
The Prevailing Belief
The intelligence community had closely followed the fortunes of the Shah in
the years before the Iranian revolution. In a written response to the Iran
report, Klaus Knorr noted that the ‘prevailing belief’ about the situation in
Iran apparently was in place by 7May 1968, the publication date of a ‘Special
Memorandum’ entitled ‘The Shah’s Increasing Assurance’. Jervis found that
the judgments presented in this memo still constituted the conventional
wisdom about the situation in Iran in the fall of 1978. According to the 1968
memorandum:
The Shah is said to have dramatically strengthened the position of the
monarchy during the past decade. He has undercut the already
fragmented opposition by carrying out economic and social reforms.
From a timorous, titular monarch he has turned into a self-confident
potentate. Longer-range problems remain, but for some time to come
the unrest of earlier days seems under control. Over the long term, the
Shah’s policy of rapid industrialization will probably not provide a
14For example, in a response to the Iran Report, Robert Bowie noted: ‘The report seems to me
to be much affected by hindsight despite the express recognition of this danger. The premise
that the events which took place were bound to happen underlies much of the discussion.
There does not seem to be any element of contingency where events might have taken a
different turn had conditions been different or had the Shah or other followed a different
course. My perception of the way in which events unfolded was certainly different at the
time . . . I cannot convince myself that the actual course of events was inevitable until rather
later than is implied in much of the discussion of the report’. Robert R. Bowie,
‘MEMORANDUM Subject: Iran Post Mortem’, 20 July 1979, p.1.
15Iran Report, p.xiv.





































satisfactory substitute for greater political participation, but for some
time to come the unrest of earlier days seems under control.16
Analysts and officials alike generally assumed that the Shah had the nerve and
the instruments needed to repress the opposition. As a draft national
intelligence estimate dated 6 September 1978 stated: ‘The government [of
Iran] has the ability to use as much force as it needs to control violence, and
the chances that the recently widespread urban riots will grow out of control
is [sic] relatively small’.17 They also believed that it was unlikely that
disparate opposition groups would rally around the fundamentalists led by
the Ayatollah Khomeini and that opposition solidarity would be fleeting.
These beliefs were particularly resistant to falsification because in the
absence of the disintegration of the Shah’s regime, it was hard to identify
disconfirming evidence. As Jervis noted, just because the opposition was
unified on a given day did not mean that it would not fragment in the near
future. The Shah’s refusal to use force in the face of some ongoing disturbance
also did not mean that he would refrain from using force against a future
demonstration. In fact, restraint could be taken evidence that the opposition
was not all that serious because the Shah had failed to respond to the
protestors. Ironically, analysts actually couched their reporting about
the Shah’s failure to respond forcefully to disturbances with warnings that
the Shah might possibly use excessive force in the face of additional
provocations. Analysts did have information about the Shah’s dispirited
attitude and vacillation when it came to responding to the protests. Because
they were accustomed to firm direction from the Shah, his overall behavior in
the face of growing opposition ledmany of his followers to believe that hewas
‘losing his grip’, an important observation that was never fully explored in
agency reporting.18
The way that Shi’a clerics emerged as a focal point for the opposition to the
Shah constituted a wild card in the situation facing analysts. The Iran report
notes, for example, that NFAC analysts tended to see Khomeini’s appeal as
based on a fundamentalist response to the Shah’s ‘white revolution’; they
believed that opposition was based on a rejection of industrialization and the
general effort to modernize Iranian society at the expense of Islamic
principles. In their minds, this platform made Khomeini a poor rallying point
for the opposition because most groups adopted agendas that had little to do
with Islamic fundamentalism. In hindsight, analysts missed key aspects of
Khomeini’s agenda that made him an attractive, populist force inside Iran.
Khomeini championed the rich over the poor when it came to the Shah’s
economic programs. He depicted the Shah as a foreign tyrant, a nationalist
theme that had great appeal among Iranians. Khomeini’s ability to speak and
act from authority without any formal position is common in Shi’a traditions,









































but at the time was not well recognized by analysts.19 The intelligence
community apparently underestimated Khomeini’s skill as a politician and
overestimated the impact of the fact that he was a fundamentalist preacher in
a relatively secular society.
Intelligence Pathologies
Jervis and Devlin also found of evidence of the interaction between beliefs
and information in several intelligence pathologies that emerged in CIA
reporting in the months leading up to the Iranian revolution. Analysts fell
victim to an ‘empirical bias’, a tendency to report facts as they unfolded
without attempting to place them in a broader historical context or using
them to reassess prevailing beliefs and assumptions. The following passage
from the report, provides an interesting description of how the empirical bias
can vector analysts along a narrow analytic path:
In the case of Iran, the system produced a steady stream of summaries of
recent events with a minimal degree of commentary, analysis, and
prediction . . . The problems are greatest with the National Intelligence
Daily, which concentrates on telling what has happened and only rarely
contains analysis or forecasts of political trends and developments . . .
Furthermore, stories in the National Intelligence Daily, like those in the
newspapers, which the National Intelligence Daily so strongly
resembles, generally do not assume that the reader has been closely
following events. They therefore do not build on what the analysts have
said before, steadily producing a better understanding of the underlying
forces or the dynamics that are believed to be at work.20
Like good reporters, analysts stuck to the ‘facts’ of the situation without
adding much analysis. The Iran report also noted that current intelligence
failed to offer an appropriate format for in-depth analysis and reassessment
of prevailing wisdom – articles were intended to be short, factual, and catchy.
Time pressures and the constraints imposed by previous analyses – analysts
might have felt constrained by existing themes in their reporting – also
worked against any sort of fundamental reexamination of unfolding events.
The empirical bias also has an extremely negative impact when it comes to
predictive intelligence because it tends to turn the analyst into a historian. It
shifts the analyst’s focus to what has happened from a more concerted effort
to anticipate what might happen in the future.
Another pathology was identified by intelligence managers in their
response to the Iran report: a breakdown in the relationship between analysts
and officials when it came to integrating US policy into assessments of the
Shah’s future. According to Klaus Knorr:
19Ibid., p.xiii.
20Ibid., p.22.





































There is perhaps one angle – an extremely sensitive one – which the
post-mortem may be said to have neglected. The post-mortem argues
that there was enough information to call into question the underlying
assumption on the solidity of the Shah’s power and the weakness of his
domestic opposition. Yet, if a serious re-examination of this
preconception had taken place, it would have been hard to avoid the
impact of US policy toward Iran. Not only may US policy on human
rights and political liberation have pushed the Shah further than it was
safe to go, there is also the question of whether he felt that his option of
restoring order by suing the military was weakened by US policy.21
Analysts apparently failed to realize that US policy was directly opposed to
their expectations related to the Shah’s response to his domestic opposition.
To the extent US policy succeeded, the less likely it would be that the Shah
would ‘over react’ in responding to the demonstrators. The resulting lack of
‘net assessment’ (measuring the impact of US policy on the target) is an
externality produced by the tendency of analysts to remain detached from
policy and the policy process. With the aid of additional hindsight, it is
probably safe to say that the Shah’s illness, rather than a deep respect for the
preferences of US policy-makers, probably led him to vacillate when faced
with concerted domestic opposition. Nevertheless, how to strike the proper
balance between policy-makers and analysts when it comes to intelligence
estimates remains an unresolved issue today.22
Jervis and Devlin also identified a structural weakness within the
intelligence community related to the fall of the Shah. There were very few
analysts working on Iran in the months leading up to the Iranian revolution,
too few to provide any sort of peer review, competitive analysis or even
ongoing informal assessments of trends and analysis. No secondary effort
was maintained to backstop current analysis. Analysts were also isolated by
bureaucratic stovepipes, and no effort was made to reach out to the broader
academic community to identify competing analyses or divergent
perspectives.23
The Iraq NIE
Type I errors, false positives, are not necessarily rare in the annals of
intelligence – indeed they are often described as the ‘cry wolf’ syndrome, a
well-known intelligence pathology. But, it is rare that they are the subject of
postmortems because they generally are not the proximate cause of the more
spectacular forms of intelligence failure. This observation applies to the 2002
NIE on Iraq. In the words of Paul Pillar: ‘Official intelligence on Iraqi
weapons programs was flawed. But even with its flaws, it was not what led to
21Knorr, ‘Memorandum for Dr Bowie’, p.6.
22James J. Wirtz, ‘The Intelligence–Policy Nexus’ in Loch K. Johnson (ed.) Strategic
Intelligence, Vol. 1 (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International 2007) pp.139–150.
23Iran Report, p.vii.





































the war. On the issue that mattered most, the intelligence community judged
that Iraq probably was several years away from developing a nuclear
weapon’.24 Instead, intelligence was used to bolster what amounted to an
existing preference of both the British and US governments to launch a
preventive war to topple Saddam Hussein from power in Baghdad.25 The
political decision to end Saddam’s regime through the use of force if necessary
was apparently in place before the publication of the 2002 NIE on Iraq.
This state of affairs did not generate a firestorm of protest from the
intelligence community in the months leading up to the US invasion of Iraq
because it was generally accepted among US and allied policy-makers and
intelligence analysts that Iraq was involved in some sort of activity related to
the acquisition, production or storage of weapons of mass destruction. No
intelligence ‘dissenters’ were speaking out against this prevailing wisdom in
themonths leading up to the invasion. By contrast, the intelligence community
fought to counter the GeorgeW. Bush administration’s assertion that Saddam
and Al Qaeda were in cahoots, especially when it came to planning or
conducting the September 11, 2001 terror attacks against the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon. But when it came to Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction programs, disagreements between the intelligence community and
the Bush administration were on the margins, over details and matters of
emphasis. Jervis recognizes this state of affairs. Unlike the Iran report, which
noted that there was evidence to contradict pre-existing mindsets, the Iraq
postmortem takes a far more circumspect position on availability of
contradictory evidence in the months leading up to the Second Gulf War. As
Jervis noted in another context: ‘the fundamental reason for the intelligence
failure in Iraqwas that the assumptions and inferences were reasonable, much
more so than the alternatives’.26 There simply was little evidence to overturn
what in hindsight appears to be a highly plausible assessment of Iraq’s ongoing
interest in developing or maintaining a weapons of mass destruction
capability.
The Prevailing Belief
The origins of the intelligence community’s overestimate of Iraq’s weapons of
mass destruction capability probably can be found in its underestimation of
Iraq’s nuclear capabilities that became apparent in the aftermath of the First
24Paul R. Pillar, ‘Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq’ in James P. Pfiffner and Mark
Phythian (eds.) Intelligence andNational Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American
Perspectives (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2008) p.235.
25John Dumbrell, ‘The Neo-conservative Roots of the War in Iraq’, in James P. Pfiffner and
Mark Phythian (eds.) Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and
American Perspectives (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2008) pp.19–39; Scott
Lucas, ‘Recognising Politicization: The CIA and the Path to the 2003War in Iraq’, Intelligence
and National Security 26/2–3 (April–June 2011) pp.203–227; Jervis, ‘Reports, Politics and
Intelligence Failures’, pp.6–7.
26Jervis, ‘Reports, Politics and Intelligence Failures’, p.42.





































Gulf War. Information obtained by US forces in the immediate aftermath of
the war, data gleaned from United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
inspections, and the revelations of Hussein Kamil settled first order questions
about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction programs: the Iraqi
regime was interested in all types of weapons of mass destruction. Baghdad
also seemed determined to hide the extent and nature of its programs,
attempting to confirm only information that was already uncovered by
UNSCOM.27 With justification, the intelligence community concluded that
information available to it before the First Gulf War really was just the tip of
the iceberg and at least until the mid-1990s, more data became available that
painted an increasingly vivid picture of Iraq’s past weapons of mass
destruction efforts. What emerged was a policy–intelligence consensus about
Iraq’s WMD: Saddam Hussein would do everything in his power to obtain
weapons of mass destruction, the full extent of Iraq’s weapons development
program was being concealed by the regime, and new data generally
confirmed worst case estimates of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
capability. The very nature of this shared view made it inherently difficult to
discredit or disconfirm. According to Jervis:
Much of the reason why each new bit of information that could be
interpreted as showing that Iraq had active programs was interpreted in
this way was the hold of the belief that Saddam was doing all that he
could to get WMD. Ambiguities were missed or downplayed,
alternative interpretations rarely were fully considered . . . and when
they were . . . the more damning implications won support in part
because they fitted with the prevailing view.28
This estimate and the baseline data used to assess Iraq’s weapons programs
did not significantly change until the aftermath of the Second Gulf War. This
is an example of the ‘layering effect’ identified by the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence. Judgments based on past analysis focused on historical
events, slowly but surely formed the basis of contemporary assumptions
about the situation in Iraq. One might also add that given the combination of
time constraints created by the need to produce current intelligence and the
‘cut and paste’ capabilities created by the information revolution, it was far
easier to integrate new information into the conventional wisdom, rather
than return to first principles in every piece of finished intelligence.
A turning point for the intelligence community came with the ejection of
UNSCOM inspectors in the late 1990s. New information about Iraq’s
activities was now in short supply, making information from past inspections
about past activities all the more central to efforts to write current estimates.
The ejection of the UNSCOM inspectors itself became an important part of
the ongoing estimates. No longer hamstrung by the threat of detection by
27Gregory D. Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 2009) pp. 74–105.
28Jervis, ‘Reports, Politics and Intelligence Failures’, p.22.





































UNSCOM, analysts concluded that the Iraqi regime would be able to restart
its WMD programs and given Saddam Hussein’s objectives, probably would
restart its WMD programs. The reasonable assumption (the more ‘damning
implication’ in Jervis’s words) was that Saddam would avail himself of the
opportunity created by the breakdown of the inspection regime.
What analysts failed to realize, however, was that the Iraqi regime had been
subjected to nearly a decade of international sanctions, UNSCOM
inspection, continuous over flights, and concerted preventive attacks (Gulf
War I and Operations Desert Fox) intended to destroy, disrupt and dissuade
further efforts to produce, store or militarize (train, equip, exercise) weapons
of mass destruction. These actions had a profound impact on the ability or
will of the Iraqi regime to continue its WMD programs, despite the fact that
the Iraqi regime continued to create suspicion that nefarious activities
continued outside the prying eyes of the intelligence community. In other
words, there was a complete absence of a ‘net assessment’ when it came to
assessing Iraq’s current ability to fulfill SaddamHussein’s objectives. Analysts
seemed to discount the possibility that a decade of concerted US and
international action had taken a toll on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
programs. Ironically, the real failure of the Iraq NIE was a failure to recognize
US policy success: Iraq had been fundamentally constrained by a decade’s
worth of concerted counter-proliferation strikes, sanctions and scrutiny.
If analysts were going to assess accurately the changing nature of Iraq’s
WMD programs and current capabilities, they needed to step outside this
policy–intelligence consensus about Iraqi behavior. This type of assessment is
extraordinarily difficult because analysts would have to abandon their own
policy–analytical–historical context to assess available information in a
detached way. The intelligence community failed to take this reassessment of
Iraqi policy and capability and, as far as we can tell, no one in the IC even
thought to reassess the underlying assumptions behind the Iraq estimate. No
one realized that the policy–intelligence consensus was no longer falsifiable
because positive and negative evidence (because of deep suspicions about
Iraqi denial and deception) suggested the presence of a clandestine Iraqi
nuclear program.29 If matters look cut and dried to intelligence analysts,
suspicions should be raised that matters might be a little too cut and dried.
This did not occur, however, in terms of the Iraq NIE. Some individuals were
uneasy with what they considered to be slightly overstated findings in the Iraq
NIE and that one had to read the text of the estimate to appreciate important
caveats in its findings. But no one felt compelled to make his or her concerns
known at the time the NIE was released by the intelligence community.
Intelligence Pathologies
Why did the authors of the NIE fail to realize that their underlying
assumptions had been overtaken by events? Several obstacles stood in the way
of anyone who wanted to look outside that policy–analytical–historical
29Ibid., p.27.





































context. These obstacles constitute specific reasons why analysts failed to
reassess conventional wisdom. In a sense, the reason why analysts fail to
reassess shared beliefs that they consider to be useful and accurate seems self-
explanatory, but these intelligence pathologies helped to reduce the likelihood
that analysts might recognize that something was amiss in the first place.
Agency personnel were under a pressure to produce, faced many demands
from a variety of sources, and operated within a ‘culture of excellence’.
Ironically, the pressures to meet the demands of producing current intelligence
have been exacerbated by the information revolution, which provides more
ways that policy-makers can reach down into the bureaucracy to task analysts
and managers. In other words, analysts and mangers, individuals and offices
are judged by their ability to keep fulfill an ever increasing demand for their
products. To intelligencemanagers and analysts, who provide what amounts to
a free service to their consumers, their ability to generate output to meet this
demand is the criterion used to judge success. Meeting the demands of the day,
not a detached review of well-supported assumptions and accepted wisdom, is
what is most valued under these circumstances. The ‘culture of excellence’
means that analysts cannot spend toomuch time on any one request because all
requests must be met regardless of suspense, subject matter or obvious
importance. The old adage ‘if you want it bad, you will get it bad’, seems to be
forgottenwhen it comes tomeeting the demands for current intelligence. Under
these circumstances, there is little incentive to return to first principles when it
comes to giving what appears to be obvious answers to well known questions.
Analysts also seemed to lose track of the sources of information used in their
analysis. The same sources were apparently referred to in different reports in
different ways, leading analysts to overestimate the amount and variety of
information supporting a given position. According to Jervis, ‘this led analysts
to overestimate the number of different sources who were reporting. In other
cases, the descriptions [of the sources] omitted important details about the
source’s specific expertise and access that would have helped the analysts judge
the information’.30 This situation becomes especially problematic when earlier
estimates are used as building blocks for new estimates: judgments that were
once offered with a degree of uncertainty tend to be treated in succeeded
generations of analytical product as facts that support new estimates. It is thus
easy to imagine the following scenario. In Week 1, analysts report that source
‘A’ has described renewed weapons manufacturing activity, inWeek 3, analysts
report that source ‘B’ has described renewed weapons manufacturing activity,
which confirm earlier reports by source ‘A’, and in Week 5 analysts report that
source ‘C’ has described renewed weapons manufacturing activity, confirming
reports by source ‘A’ and ‘B’. If one failed to recognize that data from source ‘A’,
‘B’, and ‘C’ were gleaned from the same individual during the same interview,
then this sort of analysis would simply strengthen conventional wisdom.
Negative information – information disconfirming the presence of a
significant Iraqi weapons of mass destruction capability – was apparently
never forwarded to analysts because it failed to respond to the second order
30Ibid., p.30.





































questions (i.e. where were Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction?) that were of
interest to the intelligence community. Jervis notes, for instance, that there
was widespread evidence of ‘conformation bias’ in the types of information
that was gathered on Iraq. Analysts made a concerted effort to track and
follow up on positive reporting, but there was little effort made to solicit
disconfirming information about an absence of activity in Iraq and little effort
to track and document the number of individuals who stepped forward and
reported that Iraq weapons of mass activities were moribund.31
Discredited or inaccurate reports continued to resurface in intelligence
estimates and reports. This occurred because once reports are released, they are
stored and used by analysts in various ways, even thought the originator no
longer fully supports the analysis they contain. Intelligence managers and
analysts failed to account for the impact ofmany unintended consequence of the
information age – analysts have at their disposal a virtually unlimited, and in
some respects a private, store of information and they often are the ones who
judge its veracity. The story of Iraqi efforts to purchase yellow cake in Niger
continued to emerge in various reports, for instance, despite the fact that
analysts who knew the full story discounted the significance of the entire
incident. Like an urban legend, however, the story did not die. Ironically, it
reappeared on the State Department’s own website, even though the State
Department’s own intelligence organizationwas the first agency to discredit the
report.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that Jervis’s postmortems on the Iran report, a Type II error,
and the IraqNIE, a Type I error,were separated by nearly 25 years and covered
vastly different problems and subject matter, they also display a remarkable
continuity. For instance, both postmortems identify structural shortcomings
within the intelligence community. Net assessment – how best to integrate the
impact of US policy in intelligence estimates – remained a weak spot in
estimates on Iran and Iraq. Fundamental reassessments of prevailing beliefs
also seemed beyond the reach of analysts who felt pressured to respond to the
ongoing demands of producing current intelligence products.
Additionally, both postmortems do an outstanding job at illustrating how
specific intelligence pathologies and failures in analytic tradecraft bedeviled
analysts and managers. Both also show how the cumulative impact of these
shortcomings helped to shield analysts, managers and officials fromwhat was
so apparent in hindsight – that prevailing beliefs could no longer account for
developing events. Jervis’s work thus combines first and second order
explanations of intelligence failure by linking existing belief systems to real
organizational, behavior and cognitive consequences.
Although the immediate response to Jervis’s postmortem of the Iraq NIE
apparently remains classified, there is documentary evidence to suggest that
the Iran postmortem set off a lively debate within the intelligence community
31Ibid., p.25.





































about tradecraft and the relationship between policy-makers and intelligence
analysts. More importantly, however, Jervis’s scholarly work and his direct
involvement in the intelligence community have had a lasting and important
impact on our understanding of the perils and pitfalls faced by intelligence
analysts. Today, the notion that pre-existing beliefs shape perception is a well-
accepted insight used by the intelligence community. As Richards Heuer, the
intelligence community’s most accomplished theoretician and methodologist,
noted in his recently published handbook for intelligence analysts, the impact
of ‘mental models’ is key to understanding both intelligence failure and
success:
Intelligence analysts, like humans in general, do not start with an empty
mind. Whenever people try to make sense of events, they begin with
some body of experience or knowledge that gives them a certain
perspective or viewpoint . . . Intelligence specialists who are expert in
their field have well developed mental modes. Their mental model tells
them, sometimes subconsciously, what to look for, what is important,
and how to interpret what they see.32
There was no need to append a chapter of Perception and Misperception to
the Iraq NIE postmortem. Robert Jervis’s work has played an important part
in making the intelligence community aware of how human cognition shapes
analysis.
Nevertheless, two issues raised by the postmortems remain to be fully
addressed by scholars and analysts alike. No one has yet explored the
‘clustering phenomena’ when it comes to the relationship between dominant
beliefs, intelligence pathologies and intelligence failures. Are the intelligence
pathologies identifiedby thepostmortems somehowproducedby the impactof
dominant belief systems, or are they independent phenomena made salient by
hindsight? Are intelligence pathologies present when intelligence analysts also
manage to ‘connect the dots’? Or, do intelligence pathologies also exhibit a
‘clustering phenomena’ when intelligence analysts are successful, only in this
instance they cluster in a way that supports what turn out to be accurate
estimates?
The postmortems also are true to the ‘cognitive’ perspective when it comes
to offering suggestions to improve the performance of intelligence agencies.
Jervis focuses on analytic tradecraft, not bureaucratic reorganization, as the
best way to improve intelligence. In that sense, he agrees with intelligence
analysts, who often identify the quest for better tradecraft as the best
guarantee against intelligence failure.33 The cognitive school ultimately
suggests that organizational reform or reorganization, which usually follows
32Richards J. Heuer Jr, and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for
Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: CQ Press 2011) p.5.
33Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, ‘Introduction’ in Jennifer E. Sims and Burton
Gerber (eds.) Transforming US Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press
2005) pp.ix–x.





































in the wake of intelligence failure, will do little to cultivate better analysts and
analysis. Scholars and intelligence managers, however, remain relatively
silent about the effectiveness of the waves of reorganization that periodically
sweep the intelligence community in the name of ‘intelligence reform’.
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